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During the first week of December, the U.S. President brought together the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace agreement. The commitment involved an end to decades of conflict in the unstable eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Not long after, however, a completely opposite method for violence emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, striking sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President warned, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Change of Direction

These divergent actions highlights the central feature of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a de-emphasis from promoting democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on trade and stopping hostilities—despite the fact that this fits with the nascent military strikes in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a top U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House representative stated this, commenting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Inconsistencies

This change is consequential, but analysts note it is premature to gauge its impact. The approach is influenced by the President’s direct manner, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said an analyst for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research estimates this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

Geopolitical Disinterest and Tensions

Differing from his recent predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later confirmed using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable dispute has erupted with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Engagement and Conditional Action

A comparable standoff appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the stern rhetoric may have spurred the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

An Echo of Rivals

Experts characterize the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the revised strategy likely means that “a nation that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.